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Abstract
In this paper, we study the "backbone market" in the Internet. The rst part
of the paper discusses the structure of the Internet and shows that there does
exist a separate backbone market. The second part uses an extension of the
Katz-Shapiro network model to analyze the strategies that would be used
by a rm that dominates the backbone market. We rst show that in this
market when two backbones interconnect the larger one prefers a lower qual-
ity interconnection than the smaller one. We then analyze the protability
of a \targeted degradation" strategy where a larger backbone would lower
the quality of interconnection to its smaller rivals in turn. Finally, we an-
alyze the incentives that clients would have to multihome in order to avoid
the degradation of the quality of interconnection, and show that the main
qualitative results are not aected.
1 Introduction
The Internet has entered a critically important period of transition from
government ownership to commercial exploitation. Until recently, the Inter-
net community was largely one of engineers working cooperatively to take
the Internet o the ground, and the largest part of the initial network, the
NSFNET, was privatized as late as 1995. In the commercial era that is
just beginning, nancial stakes are huge, and the Internet is turning into a
fascinating commercial battleground.
While players in the industry are trying to design business models and
contractual arrangements for the new environment, economic analysis has
yet to produce guidance for strategy and competition policy. In fact, little is
known about the \industrial organization of the Internet". The early work on
the economics of the Internet focused on the use of smart market auctions and
peak-load pricing to allocate scarce transmission capacity among competitive
end users.
1
While this work is clearly relevant, in this paper we turn our
attention on the strategic behavior of rms and on the role of antitrust policy
in the commercial Internet environment.
We will address only a small subset of the myriad fascinating questions
related to these issues, focusing on the issue of connectivity. The Internet is
a system of interconnected computer networks. In this industry character-
ized by strong network externalities, end users, consumers and businesses,
seek ubiquitous connectivity and purchase connectivity from Internet service
providers (ISPs). Internet backbone providers (IBPs) provide high band-
width long-haul transmission, routing and interconnection to these ISPs and
to their own vertically integrated ISPs and Web-hosting services. But is there
a proper \backbone market", or should one consider IBPs as Internet service
providers like all others and thus part of a broader market? And, if an IBP
market indeed exists, what strategies can a player with substantial market
power employ to enhance dominance?
These questions stood at the heart of the joint investigation in 1998 by
the US Department of Justice and the European Commission of the proposed
merger between WorldCom and MCI, which each owned one of the four
largest Internet backbones. Antitrust authorities feared that the merged
entity would have incentives to degrade the quality of its interconnection
with the rest of the Internet, to introduce proprietary standards, or to impose
tough interconnection agreements on other backbones. As a result of the
investigation, the parties were required to divest about half of their Internet
1
See, e.g., MacKie-Mason & Varian (1995a, 1995b) Gupta, Stahl & Whinston (1994)
and Shenker, Clark, Estrin & Herzog (1996).
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assets before they were allowed to merge.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of
the industry, and explains the role of backbones. Section 3 performs a market
denition and concentration analysis, thereby providing further details about
demand substitution, supply response and potential entry.
Our formal analysis builds on Katz and Shapiro's classic 1985 \model of
sponsorship" in industries with network externalities. Each backbone has an
installed base and otherwise competes for unattached customers. The benet
derived by a customer from joining a backbone is an increasing function of
the size of his or her backbone and, in a complementary fashion, of the
size of the other backbones and of the quality of interconnection with the
other backbones. This quality of interconnection is a strategic variable, and
because \it takes two to tango", the quality of interconnection is governed
by the preferences of the backbone which values interconnection the least.
The results obtained throughout the paper all rest on the comparison be-
tween two impacts, on the backbone contemplating degradation, of a change
in the quality of interconnection with another backbone. First, when connec-
tivity between the two networks is degraded, both backbones face a demand
reduction, as their customers' access to each others deteriorates. Second, a
degradation of connectivity creates a quality dierentiation between the two
networks. The larger backbone, which relies relatively less on access to the
other backbone's customers, gains a competitive advantage, and competition
between the two backbones is softened. However, when other backbones are
present, a similar quality dierentiation eect also handicaps both backbones
relative to the other ones.
Section 4 analyzes the competition between two backbones of dierent
sizes, and shows that the larger backbone has suboptimal incentives to main-
tain connectivity. Thanks to its larger installed base, the dominant backbone
also acquires dominance in the market for unattached customers when con-
nectivity is not perfect. The poorer the interconnection and the stronger the
network externality, the more dominant is this backbone, which, not surpris-
ingly, is less eager to interconnect than its rival. Degradation is more likely,
the larger the dierence in installed bases. Section 5 discusses modeling
assumptions and the robustness of the conclusions.
Section 6 extends the analysis to dierent backbones congurations. First,
it shows that if there are four equal-sized backbones, none has an incentive to
degrade interconnection. Intuitively, a backbone that degrades the quality of
2
MCI sold its Internet assets (connecting 1; 300 ISPs, 60; 000 business customers and
250; 000 consumers) to Cable & Wireless. It also agreed to transfer 1; 000 employees to
Cable & Wireless and agreed not to woo back any customer for a period of two years. In
March 1999, Cable & Wireless sued MCI WorldCom, alleging violations of the agreement.
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its interconnection with an equal-size backbone does not gain a competitive
advantage over this backbone, and its quality relative to that of the other
two backbones deteriorates.
Second, we assume that two of these backbones merge and show that the
new backbone, with its 50% market share, still has no incentives to degrade
simultaneously its two connections with the smaller backbones. However, we
show that it can be optimal for the dominant backbone to degrade inter-
connection with one of the smaller backbones, that is to employ a \targeted
degradation strategy".
Section 7 extends the analysis to allow for the possibility that customers
connect to several backbones (multihome) and analyzes whether multihom-
ing impairs a dominance-enhancing degradation strategy. It rst looks at
the impact of pre-existing multihoming by a fraction of the installed base.
Keeping the dierence in sizes of installed bases constant, it shows that pre-
existing multihoming is conducive to degradation by a dominant backbone.
Intuitively, pre-existing multihoming lowers the pain of degradation (the re-
duction of demand), as well as, in the case of targeted degradation, the
reduction in the competitive advantage enjoyed by the dominant backbone
over the nontargeted backbone; and it does not aect quality dierentiation
between the targeting and targeted backbones. Interestingly, in the targeted
degradation scenario, the dominant backbones prefers to target the small
backbone with whom it has the most extensive customer overlap.
Second, we allow new customers and singlehoming installed-base cus-
tomers to attempt to circumvent the degradation policy by connecting to
several backbones. We show that the conclusions are for the most part un-
changed. Intuitively, customers choose to multihome only if the price charged
by the second backbone to which they connect is smaller than the value that
they attach to the new connections that it provides. But in equilibrium,
the price charged by each network reects the value of the customer pool
it uniquely gives access to. Second-homing to the dominant network brings
high connectivity benets but is expensive; second-homing to a smaller net-
work is cheaper but brings low connectivity benets. Thus, multihoming
may not occur despite a degraded interconnection. Finally, we show that
if multihoming occurs in reaction to a degraded interface, the smaller back-
bone's installed base is more likely to second-home to the dominant backbone
than the dominant backbones's installed base to second-home to the smaller
backbone.
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2 Structure of the Internet
2.1 End users and network externalities
End users include residential and business users, who have access to the
Internet either through dial up (over the phone line using modems) or through
dedicated access; and web sites, which provide a wide variety of free or fee-
based content as well as oerings of services (E-commerce,...).
As its name indicates, the Internet is dened by the fact that it enables
connectivity. From its inception, it has been developed to enable communi-
cations between networks, and in its present state its most important feature
is the ability for dial-up customers, Web sites hosts and dedicated access
customers to exchange trac across the entire system of interconnected net-
works.
This connectivity has been achieved rst through the widespread adop-
tion of the TCP and IP protocols, which support transmission of packets,
irrespective of the type of data that they carry: text, video, voice, etc. The
standardization of protocols would have been of no consequence without the
build-up of interfaces between networks, rst at the Network Access Points,
and subsequently at private interconnects. The use of these interfaces has
in turn been made possible by the development of a variety of contractual
agreements between end-users and suppliers of Internet services, and between
these suppliers.
It is important to note that the Internet's basic architecture was chosen
and implemented by the US government, and especially the Department of
Defense and the NSF, with much technical assistance from the academic com-
munity. The NSF stopped managing the Internet and funding the NSFNET
on 30 April 1995, although it continues funding research designed to improve
its functioning.
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The Internet has become the largest example of a deregu-
lated communications network. However, it largely functions thanks to the
institutions, standards and protocols that were chosen when the NSF was
managing it, which in the long term will probably progressively lose their
importance as technology evolves.
The benets of connectivity arise because there are very strong network
externalities. Network externalities exist when the value for a customer of
3
The NSF funded the construction by MCI of the very high speed backbone Network
Service (vBNS), which operates at OC-12 (622 Mbps) and interconnects through ATM
switches a number of NSF-sponsored research institutions. More recently, it has pro-
vided impetus for Internet II (Abilene) for academia, and the NGI for government (for
more on the Internet activities of the NSF since privatization, see Marcus (forthcoming,
chapter 14)).
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belonging to a network increases with the number of customers in this net-
work.
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In the case of the Internet, each customer prots in many direct and
indirect ways from the presence of other customers. For instance, individuals
derive direct benets from the fact that friends and acquaintances are able
to receive and send E-mail. A rm derives direct benets from the fact that
a government agency builds a Web site where it can nd the texts of regula-
tions that aect its business. A new customer who connects to the Internet
yields indirect benets to existing customers, by increasing the incentives of
government agencies, non-prot organizations and businesses to open new
Internet sites. Consumers, whether individuals or organizations, can benet
fully from these network externalities only if connectivity is assured.
2.2 Providers of connectivity
Between end users can be found a host of intermediaries. Some interme-
diaries (for instance, search engines, portals, \infomediaries") provide users
with guidance as to where to connect, what to buy and so forth. Other in-
termediaries provide transmission services: Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
and Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs)
Internet backbone providers (IBPs) transmit data over large regions of the
world using long-haul ber-optic cables. They pick up the trac generated
by ISPs as well as that of their own customers and carry it over long distances,
connecting to each other and exchanging data at multiple points under the
so-called \peering agreements" (see below). The IBPs also have the most
sophisticated routing tables
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of all Internet players.
As we already observed, the Internet is a network of interconnected net-
works. Indeed, one of the main appeals of the Internet is its current almost
ubiquitous connectivity: From almost any point (URL address) in the net-
work can be sent messages to almost any other point. One may wonder how
a network of 7,000 ISPs (4,500 in the US) and 5 to 50 IBPs (depending on
the exact denition of IBPs
6
) can oer such ubiquitous connectivity.
The answer to this question stems from the fact that the Internet has
a basically hierarchical structure. As illustrated by gure 1, IBPs sit on
top of the hierarchy, customers lie at the bottom, and ISPs (to which can
be added regional networks) stand in between. This may seem surprising
4
See, e.g., Rohlfs (1974), Katz & Shapiro (1985), Farrell & Saloner (1985), Tirole (1988,
chapter 10) and the Journal of Industrial Economics Symposium on Compatibility (1992).
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At each node of the Internet, the routing table stores the instructions that the \router"
uses to forward incoming messages to another node.
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The ve big IBPs are Cable & Wireless (who owns the Internet assets that belonged
to MCI), Sprint, MCI WorldCom, GTE and AT&T.
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Figure 1: The conguration of the Internet.
since the Internet has been built to allow for very exible organization and
routing where the path of packets is optimized in real time depending on the
loci of congestion in the network. However, a hierarchical structure oers
several benets. It facilitates routing by reducing the complexity of routing
tables and by limiting the opportunities of gaming the system. A hierarchical
structure also facilitates interconnection agreements by limiting the number
of interconnection facilities, by clarifying responsibilities for immediacy, and
by making it more transparent what installed base one is getting access to
through a bilateral contract. Furthermore, and as we discuss in section 3,
the hierarchical structure can accommodate certain types of non-hierarchical
relationships while preserving its basic nature.
IBPs \peer" with each other. In so doing, they accept to route all trac
that is destined to their own customers, the customers of their customers,
and so on.
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Peering used to occur at public peering points, NAPs (Network
Access Points) or MAEs (Metropolitan Access Exchanges), where networks
could exchange trac. The slow expansion of the capacity at these points
while Internet trac grows at a tremendous rate has led IBPs to turn to
private peering, that is to exchanging trac pairwise at a number of bilateral
7
Notice that peering arrangements are dierent from transit agreements where a party
accepts to carry trac for another one to a third party. Peering commits each provider to
accept data destined to its customers, to the customers of its customers and so on, while
transit commits the provider to also carry data destined for third parties.
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interfaces. IBPs impose a number of conditions to accept each other as peers:
number and location of points of interface,
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national high-speed network, 24-
hour-per-day network operation center, etc. Currently, peering arrangements
are of the bill-and-keep type; that is, each peer terminates without charge
the trac originating with other peers. This feature is probably a leftover of
the transition process, and one may wonder whether IBPs will keep running
their two-way interconnection arrangements through bill-and-keep.
IBPs do not make money directly from their peering relationships. To
recover their huge investments in infrastructure, they charge their customers,
who in turn charge their own customers. Charges are related to the capacity
of the link between the network and its customer, but can also depend on
usage. Thus, the Internet can be seen as a pyramid, in which monies are
collected at the bottom and passed through to the top of the hierarchy.
To be certain, the organization of the Internet is not purely hierarchical.
For example, it may make sense for two ISPs, such as ISPs A and B in gure 1,
who are in the same city, to exchange trac directly (engage in \secondary
peering") rather than let their mutual trac move up and then down the
hierarchy. Such sideway interconnections, however, do not contradict the
fact that the Internet has a fundamentally hierarchical nature.
2.3 Threats to connectivity
Connectivity requires cooperation among rms that are otherwise competi-
tors. They must reach bilateral agreements on the locations and capacities
of interfaces, and on the nancial terms through which they exchange trac.
All the major rms that provide Internet services must reach multilateral
agreements on the protocols and standards that enable the exchange of traf-
c. Two trends will jeopardize this cooperation in the near future. First,
as the operation of the Internet has been turned over to the private sector,
and as a growing part of Internet service is provided by prot maximizing
rms, conicts of interest will become more pronounced; one cannot rely
on the generalized goodwill that characterized the \Internet community" in
the 1980s and early 1990s to ensure the future of the Internet. One of the
8
One motivation for this is to make sure that an IBP will not suer asymmetrically
from \shortest exit routing". Suppose that most of the customers of IBP #1 are located
in San Francisco while the customers of IBP #2 are evenly located in Boston and San
Francisco. When a customer of IBP #1 in San Francisco sends a message to a customer of
IBP #2 in Boston, IBP #1 gets rid of the message as quickly as possible by transmiting it
to IBP #2 near San Francisco. The message is therefore carried mostly by the receiver's
network. Conversely, IBP #2 hands the return message (say, a web page download) to
IBP #1 as soon as possible, but cannot do so if the two IBPs do not interconnect near
Boston.
7
goals of this paper is to analyze the incentives large Internet players have to
interconnect.
Second, \interconnection" involves dierent levels of quality. An obvious
dimension of quality is delay. Ignoring delays occurring at the end user's
location (e.g., web site), delays in the network occur both in the basic trans-
port function (through the speed of transmission) and at switches (routers).
These delays are managed at dierent levels on the Internet. In particular, if
congestion builds up, the TCP protocol allows the routers to ask the senders
of messages to slow down the rate at which data is sent. This limits the
sizes of the queues that build up at the routers.
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Notice that these delays
can occur both inside networks or at their interface. Current interconnec-
tion agreements are based on a \best eort" model; parties make a vague
promise that they will do their best to limit delays on their own part of the
exchanged trac. While current delays are perfectly acceptable for services
such as E-mail or Internet fax that do not require \immediacy", a number
of new services require bounded delay. The development of real-time ser-
vices such as Internet telephony,
10
interactive teaching or video-conferencing
(a surgeon in a teaching hospital giving real-time advice on an operation in
a rural hospital) requires very low and very uniform delays between sender
and receiver; new protocols will be needed to allow the development of these
applications, and networks will need to cooperate in order to oer premium
services at reasonable prices.
The development of premium services thus calls for new protocols sitting
on top of the existing protocols, that will enable prioritizing messages, ver-
ifying delays, billing, etc., as well as for the design of innovative two-way
access arrangements that induce players to oer these premium services. In
contrast, \premium services connectivity" will be lost if some large Internet
operators develop proprietary standards and oer such services on a limited
basis (between their customers), hoping that the proprietary oering will
create a competitive advantage.
Cooperation on bounded-delay services is only one of many of the chal-
lenging industrial organization issues in the Internet. Consider the devel-
opment of multicast real-time services. A football game or a concert in a
9
The trac is sometimes very variable in the short run (it is said to be bursty); then it
can increase rapidly enough that routers run out of buer space to store queued packets
before senders slow down. Then, some packets are discarded.
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Internet telephony, as its name indicates, refers to telephony over the Internet; unlike
for a traditional phone call, for which a circuit is opened and dedicated to a single con-
versation for the whole length of the call, messages, like for other Internet services, are
decomposed into tiny data packets, that may or may not take the same route, and are
reassembled at termination.
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country may be simultaneously transmitted over the Internet to millions of
viewers all over the world. In the current system, when a sender sends a
packet to multiple receivers, the packet is replicated at the source and one
copy is sent to each receiver. This obviously puts unnecessary strain on the
Internet; for example a single copy could be forwarded to a router near a
city and be replicated only at this router for the Internauts in that city who
have signaled they wanted to join the group of viewers. The standardization
of multicast routing requires cooperation among the players.
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Connectivity can in general be achieved in three ways: regulation, private
negotiation among networks, and alternative methods, such as the customer's
aliation to multiple networks. These methods of achieving connectivity
place the burden on dierent parties: the government in the case of regu-
lation, the suppliers of service in the case of private negotiations, and the
customers in the other cases.
Regulation of access has been the traditional way of guaranteeing inter-
connection for voice telephony, and this policy has been rearmed in the
United States, by the Telecommunications Act of February 1996 and by the
FCC, in the European Union, and indeed almost everywhere
12
in the world.
There is, however, a pronounced global trend toward reducing regulation and
introducing enhanced competition in the telecommunications industry, and
the 1996 US Telecommunications Act rearmed US policy that the Inter-
net remain \unfettered by Federal or State regulation". It is therefore the
competition authorities who must ensure, for example, that the benets of
connectivity not be jettisoned with the emergence of a dominant player who
would take advantage of the network externalities to `balkanize' the Internet
and enhance its dominance.
2.4 Customer loyalty
Because the commercial Internet is recent and still in ux, we have limited
knowledge of consumer behavior. Obviously, customers are highly heteroge-
nous. Dial-up users, web sites, dedicated access customers and ISPs (as
customers of other ISPs or IBPs) have dierent assessments of the price-
quality trade-o, and furthermore, each category of customers exhibits high
heterogeneity. Some customers, such as banks, value quality highly and are
11
For more details on multicast services, see Shenker et al. (1996).
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One notable exception is New Zealand, which experimented with unregulated negotia-
tions for interconnection between a dominant operator and smaller operators; this solution
has not operated smoothly, however, even though it was scrutinized under articles 36 and
27 of the competition law and even though the threat of re-regulation may also have put
some pressure on the dominant operator.
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not very price sensitive, since a loss of connectivity has dire consequences for
them. On the other hand, Fortune 500 corporate headquarters may not care
so much about small delays experienced by visitors of their web sites who
consult their annual report. Some customers (such as universities) may be
very price sensitive.
There is also a wide heterogeneity in switching costs. Like in any other
industry, switching costs may be psychological (including a limited ability to
rethink and alter at each point of time all contractual relationships one is
engaged in), technical or contractual.
One determinant of the ease with which a customer can switch suppli-
ers is the portability of IP addresses. For example, most ISPs obtain their
address space from their connectivity supplier as part of their service con-
tract, while the largest ones usually have their own address spaces. This
hierarchical structure makes much sense from a routing perspective, but it
creates substantial switching costs for those who do not have their own ad-
dress space; similarly, a dedicated access customer may need to recongure
its computers and renumber workstations following a switch. Based on high
observed churning rates, physical switching costs for dial-up customers (who
lose their E-mail addresses when they change ISPs) seem less substantial, al-
though a proper econometric study should be conducted to assess the impact
of poaching oers customer dissatisfaction on churn.
As in other industries, switching costs may also stem from contractual
provisions. Dial-up customers, web-hosting customers, dedicated access cus-
tomers and ISPs are often engaged in short-, medium- or long-term contracts
with their supplier of connectivity (often a year to a couple of years for web-
hosting and dedicated-access customers; similarly, AOL is under a ve-year
long-term contract with WorldCom). There are several possible rationales
for such long-term contracts: recovery of costs incurred by the supplier (con-
nection, collocation, set-up service costs); planning of the supplier's network
capacity and of the capacity and location of interfaces with other suppliers;
price discrimination;
13
as well as strategic behavior in a market with strong
network externalities. The impact of long-term contracts and penalties for
breach also diers widely among customers. For example, a web-hosting cus-
tomer who signs a two-year contract specifying a base volume, may face a
large switching cost if its volume stagnates or grows slowly, but only a small
switching cost if its volume explodes (since he avoids paying the penalty for
breach when reorienting most of the new demand to a new supplier).
Another interesting determinant of customer loyalty in the Internet is
information. While price dierentials are readily observable (at least upon
13
See Fudenberg & Tirole (1997).
10
request), quality dierentials may not be.
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A customer, say an ISP connect-
ing to an IBP, experiencing poor connectivity from this IBP may not know
whether the IBP or another IBP to whom the customer is contemplating
switching, is responsible for the poor transmission quality.
3 Market denition and concentration
Despite its many aws, the process of dening a market is a useful one. It
obviously helps competition authorities to screen cases and reduces the trans-
action costs of antitrust enforcement; but, equally important, it serves as a
preliminary exercise toward a fuller and more satisfactory study of \com-
petitive eects". From the point of view of this paper, we sketch a market
denition to bring out some further features of the Internet environment. We
ask whether there is such a thing as a \backbone market".
15
3.1 Reminders about market denition
The process of dening a relevant market is described in the Department of
Justice 1992 Merger Guidelines for the US and the 1997 Commission Notice
on the Denition of the Relevant Market for the European Union. The
exercise of market power by a rm or group of rms acting collusively is
constrained by consumer responses, as some consumers stop purchasing the
product(s) sold by the rms in the group, and by supply responses, which
include changes in production by rms outside the group, reconditioning and
recycling of existing goods, and entry into the industry.
Only the former { the demand substitution eects { are considered in the
denition of the market. Supply substitution is introduced when computing
the market participants' market shares. Because distinguishing between sup-
ply and demand factors is not always easy from an economic perspective,
16
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Boardwatch Magazine, though, publishes the Boardwatch Backbone Performance In-
dex. This index uses three million measurements taken from a variety of locations over a
30 day period. Despite their imperfections (see Richard (1999)), such indices do convey
information about relative performance.
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The issue of the existence of a backbone market was highly contentious in the 1998
WorldCom-MCI merger. The parties argued that there is no such thing as a backbone
market and oered to include all ISPs in the denition of the relevant market. The
European Commission and the Department of Justice thought otherwise.
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A supply can sometimes merely amount to a negative demand. For example, when
an electricity customer reacts to an increase in the price of electricity by installing its
own generating facilities, his reaction can be viewed either as a demand substitution or
as a supply response. As a consequence of this ambiguity, the theory of pricing under
market power insists that the relevant demand curve facing a rm with market power is
11
and because we are mostly interested in a description of the industry, we
will depart slightly from the legal denition and draw a broader picture by
including supply responses into the market denition.
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Market denition in both the US and Europe rests on the hypothetical
monopolist test. For example, the US Merger Guidelines state that
\A market is dened as a product or group of products and a
geographic area in which it is produced or sold such that a hypo-
thetical prot-maximizing rm, not subject to price regulation,
that was the only present and future producer or seller of those
products in that area likely would impose at least a \small but sig-
nicant and nontransitory" increase in price, assuming the terms
of sale of all other products are held constant. A relevant market
is a group of products and a geographic area that is no bigger
than necessary to satisfy this test. "
The \small but signicant" price increase is usually interpreted as a 5%
(US) or 5 to 10% (Europe) increase, but there is exibility in the choice of
this magnitude.
Thus, consider a group of rms (which we will refer to as the hypothetical
monopolist) and assume that these rms jointly raise their prices by 5 to 10%;
if this increase leads to an increase in the joint prot of the rms, their goods
constitute a market. To x ideas, assume that the rms in the group sell
an homogenous good at a uniform price p. The quantities that we need to
estimate can then easi1y be derived from elementary monopoly theory. Let
D(p) be the demand function for the services of the hypothetical monopolist,
and let c be the marginal cost of production. Ignoring xed costs, the prot
of the hypothetical monopolist is
(p) = (p, c)D(p):
A small increase in price is protable if
 <
p
p, c
;
the residual demand curve.
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In Europe, \supply side substitutability may also be taken into account when dening
markets in those situations in which its eects are equivalent to those of demand substi-
tution in terms of eectiveness and immediacy. This requires that suppliers be able to
switch production to the relevant products and market them in the short term without
incurring signicant additional costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes
in relative prices. When these conditions are met, the additional production that is put
on the market will have a disciplinary eect on the competitive behavior of the companies
involved. Such an impact in terms of eectiveness and immediacy is equivalent to the de-
mand substitution eect" (Commission Notice). Potential competition from new entrants
however is not taken into account when dening markets.
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where  = ,pD
0
(p)=D(p) is the price elasticity of demand. This elasticity is
equal to the percentage decrease in the quantity demanded induced by a one
percent increase in price. If we assume that the mark-up (p , c)=p is equal
to 50%, the hypothetical monopolist test will be satised if the elasticity
of demand for Internet backbone services is less than 2, that is if a 10%
price increase in the price of backbone services induces a decrease in demand
smaller than 20%. Note that the strength of the test depends (as it should)
on the competitiveness of the initial environment. Indeed, prots necessarily
increase if the rms initially engage in cutthroat competition (price just above
or below marginal cost).
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As is well known, applying the hypothetical monopolist test is not straight-
forward. Nonlinear pricing as well as third-degree price discrimination raise
the issue of what \price" is being increased. For example, large customers
bargain for special deals. Large ISPs such as AOL, with its 16 million sub-
scribers, may let IBPs compete for the privilege to be able to give access to
their large installed bases. They thus may be able to pay lower prices than
other customers. The multiplicity of prices however does not aect the logic
of market denition. The question, in the context of Internet connectivity,
is: Would a large ISP be able to obtain the same deal (or a deal within a 5 to
10 percent margin), were the largest IBPs to merge and form an hypothetical
monopolist, as it is able to get in today's competitive environment?
Another and related issue with the application of the hypothetical mo-
nopolist test is that the choice of the level of price increase is not innocent.
Suppose that the industry serves two types of customers. One class of cus-
tomers has an outside opportunity and will switch if prices go up by 3%. The
other class is captive. In such a world, a 5% price increase is unprotable if
the elastic class is big enough, while a much larger price increase raises prot.
[Merger guidelines in both the US and Europe recognize the diculties posed
by discrimination and allow for the consideration of \submarkets".]
Last, the impact of the price increase on prots is hard to assess in the
absence of reliable cost and demand data.
19
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Conversely, if rms initially collude to maintain prices close to the monopoly level, a
price increase will necessarily lead to a reduction in prots.
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Also, while it considers a nontransitory price increase, the hypothetical monopolist
test is in essence static in that it does not reect dynamic pricing considerations such
as introductory pricing, learning eects, or the building of installed bases { which is
particularly important in network industries.
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3.2 End-users demand substitution
We now consider a group of rms consisting of the largest backbone service
providers,
20
which we will simply refer to as \the backbone", and ask whether
this group would pass the hypothetical monopoly test. That is, we assume
that all rms operating the backbone increase their prices by 10%, so that
all direct customers face an increase in their charges of 10% for all the trac
that they send through the backbone.
21
We will refer to the backbone's
direct access customers as ISPs, but we should keep in mind that those
direct customers also include web-site hosts, universities and dedicated access
business customers connected directly to the backbone.
This price increase generates a reduction in the demand for backbone
services, through two eects: First, to the extent that ISPs pass through this
price increase to the retail price, retail customers may reduce their demand
for Internet services. This is the retail-level or end-users demand substitu-
tion. Second, ISPs may try to circumvent the price increase by establishing
direct connections to each other. These circumventing strategies represent
wholesale-level substitution and can involve bilateral arrangements (transit,
secondary peering) or more ambitious multilateral arrangements. We argue
here that retail-level substitution is unlikely to exert much pressure on the
backbone, and discuss wholesale-level substitution in more detail in the next
subsection.
In the absence of any wholesale-level substitution, an increase in the price
of backbone services induces an increase in the prices charged by the ISPs
to their dial-up and other customers, and hence a decrease in the demand
for both Internet and backbone services. However, the impact on the prices
charged by the ISPs only corresponds to the proportion of backbone costs in
the total cost of provision of Internet services. If the cost of the backbone
represents for example 30% of the total cost of Internet services, the 10%
increase in the price of backbone services induces an increase in the price of
Internet services of only 3%, even if ISPs pass it through entirely.
20
There are at the moment ve major backbones: Cable & Wireless (formerly Inter-
netMCI), MCI WorldCom (including UUnet, ANS, and other previously independent
ISPs), Sprint, GTE (including the former BBN and Genuity), and AT&T (including
@Home and the IBM Global Network); Marcus (forthcoming) assesses that \somewhere
between six and perhaps thirty other ISPs could also be viewed as Backbone ISPs".
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Although this is not represented in our gure, the backbone might have some peering
relationships, mostly for historical reasons, with a few ISPs. To conduct the hypothetical
monopoly test, we assume that the backbone refuses to accept any increase in trac
from current or potential peers, or alternatively, that it imposes high enough termination
charges for increased trac from current peers or for new trac from new peers that
customers could not avoid the customer price increase by connecting to the peers.
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While these comments refer to the reduction in demand by those end-
users who are only indirectly connected to the hypothetical monopoly back-
bone, they similarly apply to end users (web sites, universities, governmental
organizations, dedicated access business customers) who may be directly con-
nected to the monopoly backbone and are thus directly confronted with the
10% price increase.
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As in the case of indirect customers, the impact of
this price increase on the customer's total cost of Internet services depends
on the share of backbone costs in the total cost of Internet services. The
methodology is therefore similar for direct and indirect customers.
3.3 Wholesale-level demand substitution through bi-
lateral agreements
To discuss the various strategies ISPs can use to circumvent the increase in
the price of backbone services, let us return to gure 1. Dierent ISPs are
connected to the backbone. We have represented two local markets for end
users. In the rst one are present ISPs A, B, C and D, while in the other one
are present ISPs E, F and G, as well as A and B, which are large national
ISPs. Simple arrows ! represent transit or customer relationships (for the
purpose of this paper, we will not distinguish between the two). Thus, in the
gure, all the ISPs, except for ISP D are direct customers of our hypothetical
backbone monopolist. ISP D connects to the backbone through a customer
relationship with ISP C.
Because there is a substantial amount of trac between ISPs A and B
in the western local market, they have entered a local secondary peering
relationship, which is represented by the double arrow $. This implies that
all local trac in the western local market between A and B is transmitted
directly, presumably through a private interchange.
In this setting, we discuss here circumvention strategies that rely solely
on bilateral agreements: transit and local secondary peering. The next sub-
section discusses more ambitious cooperation among ISPs.
3.3.1 Purchase of transit
If the price for backbone services increases as described above, an ISP's
rst circumvention strategy might be to purchase transit from other ISPs.
For instance in gure 2, ISP F has decided not to connect directly to the
backbone, but rather to purchase transit from ISP E. Assuming that the
22
Assuming price increases are not discriminatory. The decrease in demand would be
smaller if we made the perhaps more reasonable assumption that the backbone monopolist
tailors the level of the price increase to the identity of the customer.
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Figure 2: Transit purchase by ISP F.
price increase is passed by E to F, this will not defeat it: before the price
increase, implementing such a transit relationship was not worthwhile, and
the comparative cost of direct connection to the backbone is not inuenced
by a uniform increase in prices. There will be no increase in the purchase of
transit due to an increase in the price of backbone services.
3.3.2 Local secondary peering
ISPs could also react to the price increase by \secondary peering", that is
by building direct peering relationships between themselves. This is repre-
sented in gure 3 where ISPs E and F enter a secondary peering relation-
ship. Technically, this implies that the (local) trac between E and F is
transmitted directly through a private interchange, without going through
the backbone. (The peering relationship will also put limits on the trac
that can go through this interchange: it can only be trac from a client of
one of the participating ISPs to a client of the other one.) Large ISPs like A
and B, who already had peering relationships on the western market might
also react to the price increase by building new peering relationships in other
markets, such as the eastern market in the gure.
An increase in the price for backbone services might trigger some sec-
ondary peering between ISPs. However, the new secondary peering relation-
ships would be chosen only by ISPs for whom it is currently not rational to
16
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Figure 3: Secondary peering.
peer but for whom the cost of establishing and operating local connections
is smaller than the cost of exchanging local trac through the backbone at
the new augmented price. Since local trac is usually a small fraction of
the total trac, it is likely that local secondary peering would have a limited
impact on the demand for backbone services.
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3.4 Cooperation among ISPs for an alternative to the
backbone
A more ambitious circumventing strategy, that might involve substantially
more substitution than local secondary peering, would be for some ISPs
to create a network among themselves which would oer connectivity for
long-haul communications, through a sequence of interconnections. This is
represented in gure 4, where the ISPs have created an alternative network
through a sequence of peering relationships.
This strategy would meet several obstacles that we now discuss without
attempting to quantify them. These obstacles are of two basic types: some
of them would make it dicult for the ISPs to organize their network in the
short term, the others would make this strategy expensive as a permanent
23
The backbone could furthermore raise the implicit cost of secondary peering by in-
creasing the \volume discount" in its taris (that is by aecting the 10% price increase to
the xed/at monthly connection fee to the backbone).
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Figure 4: Replacing part of the backbone by a sequence of peering relation-
ships.
business model. We discuss these two aspects in turn.
3.4.1 Getting the bandwagon rolling
Coordination A potentially large number of ISPs need to come to an
agreement, which raises concerns about coordination. The coordination
problem is aggravated by the lead time in building the new network. Set-
ting up the new connectivity structure would involve a lag, since one must
build bilateral interconnections and test new routing procedures. This lag
might lead the involved ISPs to have concerns about the credibility of the
circumvention strategy.
Switching costs Some ISPs have long-term contracts, and switching may
require changes in the IP addresses of some of them. The existence of long-
term contracts aggravates the coordination problem, while the latter costs
reduce the protability of the circumvention strategy.
Divide and conquer As in Innes & Sexton (1993), the hypothetical mo-
nopolist could make discriminatory oers, that impedes such forms of \back-
ward integration".
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3.4.2 Organizational issues
Cost and quality ineciency Whatever the legal arrangement, the num-
ber of interfaces through which packets would transit would increase and
delays would also probably increase. Furthermore, the assignment of respon-
sibility for delays would become even more dicult.
The multi-network arrangement may also give rise to gaming, which could
make routing inecient. Last, the transaction costs of dealing with many
parties could be large.
Management diculties in the alternative network Whatever the
organizational form, the management of the joint venture would involve a
large number of decisions, over which the ISPs might well disagree: nancing
of expansion of capacity (recall that trac increases very fast), the location
of new capacity, protocols, design and implementation of monitoring capa-
bilities in order to allow the allocation of responsibilities for delayed or lost
packets.
It would be dicult to agree on such decisions. Hansmann (1996) and
others argue forcefully that heterogeneity hurts associations and joint ven-
tures. In the case of concern here, there are indeed heterogeneous interests
due to dierences in locations and coverage, in customer mixes, in the size
and loyalty of installed bases, and in service oerings.
3.4.3 Other circumventing strategies
The ISPs could alternatively form a joint venture and either buy up or en-
ter into an agreement with an existing backbone (one not already included
in the group of backbone providers), or build a new backbone. This would
greatly ease contracting, as the problem of managing a large number of peer-
ing relationships would be simplied. However, the \bandwagon obstacles"
mentioned above would remain. Lead time would also be long as the new
backbone would need to build a substantial amount of capacity (leasing or
adding ber is not the problem, but hiring (scarce) personnel with the ability
to run an IBP and setting up the routers and the interconnection software
would be). And some ISPs might not want to become part of the new venture
if they doubt that the others will join the parade.
3.5 Entry into the backbone market
Relatedly, in response to the price increase, a new backbone, or a little less
unlikely, a small backbone not already included in the group, could build up
19
capacity. For that new backbone to be credible, it would have to expand its
capacity quickly and sign up a substantial fraction of the market. Such an
entrant would face important obstacles.
24
First, it is very costly to build a large network fast (shortage of quali-
ed personnel, lack of learning by doing). Second, the bandwagon obstacles
mentioned above would still have to be faced. In particular, given the impor-
tance of network externalities, it would be very hard to convince customers
to migrate to the new network. Third, the protability of expansion is prob-
lematic. As the new backbone would compete head to head with the hypo-
thetical monopolist, its prots would be small unless it signs up a substantial
proportion of customers.
3.6 Market shares
Although quantitatively very rough, the analysis above strongly suggests
that if the largest backbones merged, then their customers would be better
o accepting a 5 to 10% price increase and keep ubiquitous connectivity
rather than trying to cooperate to design a complex and costly circumventing
strategy and at the very least lose some connectivity. This holds all the more
as the backbone market is currently quite competitive and prices of access
to the backbones are low.
When contemplating, say, a merger, competition policy ocials must
then assess the combined market share of the merging parties. This is no
easy task, all the more as market shares can be assessed for example in terms
of revenues, trac, or capacity. For example, in the WorldCom-MCI merger
case, the European Commission estimated that backbone market (which they
called \top-level ISP") was composed of 16 rms whose total revenues was
USD 2,300 million in 1997 and stated that on the basis of revenue:
25
\WorldCom's share would have been [between 35 and 45%](*),
and MCI would have added some [between 5 and 15%](*), giving
the combined group some [between 45 and 55%](*) of the mar-
ket. Its two nearest competitors would have enjoyed a combined
market share of [between 15 and 25%](*)"
26
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A strategy for building a new backbone could be to merge and link ISPs. This is
the strategy used by Verio, created in March 1996, the Company which has acquired over
45 independent ISPs (see http://www.verio.com). Such a strategy would face the same
obstacles as those described in the text.
25
\Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that condential information is not
disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk."
26
European Commission (1998) at x 104.
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On the basis of trac ows, the market was very concentrated if the
backbone market were considered as being composed of GTE, MCI, Sprint
and the WorldCom group, with WorldCom's market share between 50 and
60% and that of MCI between 15 and 25%, whereas with the other twelve
backbones added in, the combined shares of MCI andWorldCom was between
42 and 52%. (European Commission (1998), at xx 111 to 113.)
4 Duopoly
In this section, we use a highly stylized model of network externalities in order
to analyze the competition between two backbones, which dier in the size
of their installed bases. We show that the backbone with the larger installed
base has a strategic motivation for degrading the quality of interconnection.
4.1 Demand side
There are two backbones, i = 1; 2, and a large number of customers, who can
be thought of as ISPs, dial-up users or dedicated access customers indier-
ently, because the only feature of their demand on which we will focus is their
preference for connectivity. Backbone i has an installed base of customers

i
 0, with 
1
 
2
, and we will refer to backbone 1 as the \bigger" or \dom-
inant" backbone and to backbone 2 as the \smaller" backbone (we will show
later on that the bigger backbone also attracts more new customers and thus
stays bigger). We assume that the installed bases are locked in previously
signed contracts, whose terms cannot be changed by the networks.
There are also new or unattached customers for which the two backbones
compete. An unattached customer of type  2 [0; 1] obtains a net surplus
from subscribing to backbone i at price p
i
equal to
 + s
i
, p
i
;
where s
i
, the quality of service of backbone i, is given by
s
i
= v [(
i
+ q
i
) +  (
j
+ q
j
)] ; (1)
with q
i
the number of unattached customers enrolled by backbone i, q
j
the
number of unattached customers signed up by the rival backbone,
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 2 [0; 1]
the quality of interconnection (we discuss this in more detail in 5.3), and v
a parameter that reects the importance of connectivity.
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More generally, when the symbols i and j are both used in an equation, j will be
assumed dierent from i.
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We assume that the parameter  is uniformly distributed, which is equiv-
alent to assuming that the demand curve is linear. We normalize the total
population of new customers to 1 and, in order to ensure the existence of a
stable equilibrium, we assume
v <
1
2
:
Higher values of v would imply tipping eects and instability.
4.2 Supply side
4.2.1 Capacities and prices
Following Katz & Shapiro (1985), backbones compete a la Cournot over
unattached consumers: they choose their capacities for market expansion si-
multaneously. Given these capacities, prices adjust at levels such that a) con-
sumers are indierent between the two backbones and b) demand is equal to
supply. Backbones charge monthly subscriber fees but do not price usage.
This assumption, which is made for tractability, is consistent with the mod-
elling of the demand side, where the consumer gross surplus depends only on
the number of on-net and o-net communication links not on the intensity
of their usage. In practice, the utility of a customer and fees depend on us-
age; we do not believe that taking this fact into account would qualitatively
change our results.
A priori unattached customers view the two backbones as perfect substi-
tutes, thus, if both
28
of them attract new customers, the \quality-adjusted
prices" is the same:
p
1
, s
1
= p
2
, s
2
= p^: (2)
The marginal customer, who is indierent between using the Internet
(with either backbone, from (2)) and not using it, has valuation  = p^. From
the uniform distribution assumption, we obtain
q
1
+ q
2
= 1, p^: (3)
Together, equations (1), (2) and (3) determine the equilibrium prices
(p
1
; p
2
) as functions of the capacities (q
1
; q
2
): for i 6= j = 1; 2;
p
i
= 1, (q
i
+ q
j
) + s
i
= 1 + v (
i
+ 
j
), (1, v) q
i
, (1, v) q
j
: (4)
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We will provide conditions under which this is indeed the case, but we are also in-
terested in the possibility of \corner solutions" in which one of the backbones does not
attract any new customer.
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Last, we will assume that backbones incur a cost c from connecting each
additional customer.
4.2.2 Connectivity
To analyze the backbones' decisions on the quality of interconnection, we
now consider the following game:
1. Each backbone i chooses a quality 
i
for its \side" of the connection;
the quality  of the interconnection is then equal to min f
1
; 
2
g.
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2. Given the quality determined in stage 1, the backbones choose their
capacities and prices are determined as above by (4).
We assume that the cost for backbone i of a connectivity level 
i
is F (
i
)
where F is a nonnegative and weakly increasing function. Let 

i
denote
the preferred connectivity level of rm i. As described in the above timing,
we posit that the equilibrium connectivity is min f

1
; 

2
g :
30
We show here
that, as is usually the case in models with network externalities, the larger
rm prefers a lower degree of connectivity than the smaller rm, so that in
equilibrium  = 

1
 

2
. Furthermore, since backbone 1's preferred level of
connectivity decreases when its size increases, connectivity is lower the more
dominant the large backbone.
Alternatively,  could be determined through a bargaining process in
which a rm would subsidize the other in order to provide a higher level of
connectivity. If minf

1
; 

2
g prevails in the absence of agreement then, and
assuming for example that a generalized Nash bargaining solution prevails,
the backbones would choose a level of connectivity  and a payment t from
the small backbone to the bigger one which maximize
f[(
1
(), F () + t], [
1
(minf

1
; 

2
g), F (minf

1
; 

2
g)]g

 f[(
2
(), F (), t], [
2
(min f

1
; 

2
g), F (min f

1
; 

2
g)]g
1 
;
where 
i
() denotes the prot of backbone i, gross of the connectivity cost,
and  and 1,  are the relative bargaining powers of backbones 1 and 2.
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This technological assumption translates into a strong complementarity between the
investments of the two backbones in improving connectivity.
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In a pure-strategy equilibrium, both backbones choose the same 
i
, and it is well
known that such a game can have many equilibria: if rm i expects rm j to choose 
j
, it
has no reason to choose a 
i
greater than 
j
. Because rm j makes the same reasoning the
two rms can coordinate on any   min f

1
; 

2
g. From the viewpoint of the two rms,
 < min f

1
; 

2
g is inecient, and we will assume that they coordinate on min f

1
; 

2
g.
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The former, \no transfer" assumption seems appropriate whenever it is
dicult to write a contract that xes the level of connectivity. In contrast, if
it is easy to write such a contract and to monitor compliance, we would expect
parties to come to an agreement about the level of connectivity, validating the
latter, \compensating transfer" assumption. For simplicity, we focus here on
the no-transfer case, but proposition 3 on page 28 shows that the qualitative
conclusions carry over to the compensating-transfer case.
Last, we should note that the assumption that the cost of connectivity is
a function solely of the connectivity parameter oversimplies the reality. We
will discuss this point in more detail in section 5.3.
4.3 Equilibrium
Given that the prot associated with the installed base is constant, backbone
i chooses q
i
so as to maximize its gross prot
(p
i
, c) q
i
= [1 + v (
i
+ 
j
), (1, v) q
i
, (1, v) q
j
, c] q
i
:
For a given level of connectivity , and the equilibrium quantities are
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q

i
=
1
2

2 (1, c) + v (1 + ) 
2 (1, v) + (1, v)
+
(1, ) v
i
2 (1, v), (1, v)

; (5)
where  = 
1
+
2
is the total installed base and 
1
= ,
2
= 
1
,
2
 0 the
dierence between the sizes of the two backbones' installed bases (to simplify
notation, we will sometimes write  for 
1
).
Increasing the quality of the interconnection has two eects: a demand
expansion eect and a quality dierentiation eect. Other things being equal,
a better connectivity benets consumers and, in equilibrium, total demand
also increases:
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q

1
+ q

2
=
2 (1, c) + v (1 + ) 
2 (1, v) + (1, v)
: (6)
However, although new customers a priori view the two backbones as
perfect substitutes, backbone 1, who has a bigger installed base, benets
31
The equilibrium is stable (in the usual \ta^tonnement" meaning) if v < 1=2, as this
implies that the slope of the reaction functions is smaller than 1 for any  in [0; 1].
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This implies that equilibrium quality-adjusted price p^

= b

= 1   (q

1
+ q

2
) also
decreases, that is, unattached consumers still benet in equilibrium from a better connec-
tivity.
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from a better perceived relative quality
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when connectivity is not perfect.
As a result, it also becomes dominant on the market for new customers as
q

1
, q

2
=
(1, ) v
2 (1, v), (1, v)
is strictly positive
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except when  = 1.
Up to the constant prot from the installed base and the connectivity
cost, the equilibrium prots are given by


i
= (1, v) (q

i
)
2
;
and thus covary with the equilibrium quantities. The bigger backbone ben-
ets from the quality dierentiation eect, which it trades o against the
demand expansion eect, as can be seen on equation (5). The rst term is
the same for both backbones: it corresponds to the demand expansion eect
and increases with . The second term stems from the dierence in installed
bases: it also increases for the small backbone but decreases for the big one
when connectivity is enhanced. The greater the dierence in installed bases,
the greater backbone 1 gains in comparative quality when  decreases and
thus, the lower its desired level of connectivity.
Therefore, the bigger backbone has less incentives to maintain connec-
tivity, and its incentives further decrease when the dierence in installed
bases increases. Since the bigger backbone de facto sets the industry-level of
connectivity, we can establish:
Proposition 1 The larger backbone prefers a lower quality of interconnec-
tion than the smaller backbone: 

1
 

2
. Moreover, its preferred quality
of interconnection decreases when its advantage in installed base increases:
keeping the total installed base  constant, 

1
is a (weakly) decreasing func-
tion of .
Proof. Up to the constant prot from the installed base, backbone i's
33
Models of vertical quality dierentiation were rst studied by Gabszewicz & Thisse
(1979) and Shaked & Sutton (1982).
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For  small and v large enough (namely, when v > 1= (3  2)), the dierence in
number of new susbscribers actually exceeds the dierence in installed bases (q

i
  q

j
>

i
  
j
).
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prot is 

i
, F , and simple computations show that
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2
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< 0:
The conclusions then follow from a standard revealed preferences argument
(using the fact that 
1
> 0 > 
2
).
The trade-o between the demand expansion eect and the quality dif-
ferentiation eect is best seen when connectivity is costless (F () = 0). In
that case, the smaller backbone always prefers a perfect connectivity (

2
= 1)
while the bigger backbone either prefers perfect connectivity (if its installed
base superiority is small) or no connection at all (

1
= 0); the bigger backbone
is more likely to choose not to interconnect when the network externality is
large (v close to its maximum value of 1=2) and less likely to do so if the
total size of the installed base is large ( large, so that the demand expansion
eect of a better connectivity is important):
Proposition 2 If F () = 0 for all :
i. the equilibrium quality of interconnection is either 0 or 1;
ii. for a given total installed base , there exists a threshold 

such
that the equilibrium quality of interconnection is 1 if  < 

and 0
if  > 

. The threshold 

a) increases when the total installed
base  increases and b) decreases when either the marginal cost c or
the magnitude of network externalities v increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the quality of interconnection is costly, perfect connectivity ( = 1) is
in general neither socially ecient nor privately optimal, even for the smaller
backbone. However, from Proposition 1, the larger backbone still prefers
a lower interconnection quality than the smaller backbone. Moreover, the
dominant backbone's best strategy is still to refuse interconnection if it is
optimal to do so in the absence of a cost of quality of interconnection.
In any event, the level of connectivity is lower than what would be socially
desirable, since the bigger backbone (which determines the industry level of
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, where both  and   are decreasing functions of .
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connectivity) takes into account the impact of its interconnection decision
neither on its rival, whose prot increases with the level of connectivity, nor
on consumers, who also benet from an improved connectivity in the relevant
case where 

1
> 0:
 unattached consumers always benet from a better connectivity, since
the quality-adjusted price p^ decreases with ;
 installed-base consumers also benet from a better connectivity, since
it provides a better access to the other backbone's consumers and more-
over attracts additional consumers on both backbones.
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An increase in the bigger backbone's installed base advantage reduces its
incentives to maintain connectivity, thus exacerbating the divergence between
social welfare and private incentives and leading to a quality of interconnec-
tion further below the socially desirable level.
5 Modeling assumptions
We now discuss the robustness of our analysis to the modeling assumptions.
5.1 Negotiated connectivity
We have assumed that the equilibrium connectivity is equal to the level set by
the network that values connectivity the least. Let us briey analyze the op-
posite polar case in which the networks can contract on the quality of their
interconnection before waging product market competition. As discussed
above, under these circumstances, the smaller network in general bribes the
larger network to accept a higher level of connectivity. (Alternatively, and
probably more realistically, the smaller network can undertake a dispropor-
tionate fraction of the interconnection investment.
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) From a social welfare
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Backbone i's installed-base consumers enjoy network externalities
v

(
i
+ q

i
()) + 
 

j
+ q

j
()

and an increase in  always increases q

2
. If 

1
> 0 then, since 

1
maximizes
(1  v) (q

1
())
2
=4   F () it must be the case that q

1
(

1
)  q

1
(0) (since F is nonde-
creasing), and thus that any level  higher than 

1
attracts more new customers than any
lower level (since q

1
is convex in ).
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In reality, it could very well be that the size of the bribe that has to be paid is greater
than the total cost of connectivity. The analysis that follows assumes that in this case the
backbones nd some other way to transfer funds between each other.
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perspective, though, the relevant variable is the resulting level of connectiv-
ity. This level, 

, maximizes joint prot:
38
max

f
1
() + 
2
(), 2F ()g :
Intuitively, the negotiated level of connectivity will be intermediate be-
tween what would be optimal for each backbone. Less obvious a priori is
the impact of the dierence in installed bases, since a larger dierence in-
creases the smaller backbone's demand for connectivity but further reduces
the bigger backbone's one. However, an increase in  decreases the preferred
connectivity of the bigger backbone more than it increases the preferred con-
nectivity of the smaller backbone, and therefore a larger asymmetry between
the two installed bases reduces the negotiated level of connectivity. The rea-
son is that a low level of connectivity increases the \vertical dierentiation"
between the two networks and thereby softens product market competition.
Proposition 3 The negotiated level of connectivity, 

, satises 

1
 




2
and d

=d  0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The qualitative conclusions obtained when assuming that connectivity is
noncontractable are therefore still valid when connectivity is contractable and
freely negotiated by the parties: the negotiated level of connectivity, which
lies somewhere between the two parties' privately optimal levels, decreases
when the bigger backbone's installed base advantage increases.
5.2 Modeling of competition
The Cournot-cum-installed-bases model employed in this paper is highly styl-
ized. Its tractability would be no justication for using it if we did not believe
that, despite its limitations, it yields the \right picture". We should there-
fore discuss the robustness of our conclusions to the modeling of competition.
The assumptions of the foregoing model may understate in some ways and
overstate in others the diculty faced by a smaller player in resisting to a
dominant rm.
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Any ecient bargaining process will lead the parties to maximize their joint prot
and to divide it according to their bargaining power. For example, the outcome of the
generalized Nash-solution suggested in the previous section consists of the joint-prot
maximizing level of connectivity and a transfer from the smaller backbone to the bigger
one; this transfer increases with the bargaining weight  of the bigger backbone.
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A couple of assumptions stack the deck against the possibility of the
extension of market dominance. First, we have imposed an upper bound on
the magnitude of network externalities by requiring equilibria to be \stable".
Larger network externalities would give rise to \tipping eects" and make it
more likely that the industry would be monopolized.
Second, and relatedly, we have assumed that networks compete in their
capacities to enlist and serve new subscribers. Were capacities to adjust fast
as a response to increases in demand, Bertrand competition would be a more
appropriate assumption than Cournot competition. Bertrand competition
gives rise to stronger tipping eects. We have tested the robustness of our
conclusions by exploring an alternative model where the two (now horizon-
tally dierentiated) backbones compete in prices rather than in capacities,
and shown that the same conclusions apply. The larger backbone has still
less incentives to invest in the quality of interconnection; and, assuming away
the costs of interconnection, a small backbone always favors the highest pos-
sible interconnection quality, whereas the dominant backbone may prefer a
lower quality level, and even  = 0.
In contrast, we have assumed that installed bases are locked in. Sec-
tion 2.4 discussed at length the various psychological, physical and contrac-
tual switching costs in this industry. Yet, the assumption that the installed
bases are locked in is too strong. While installed base customers would not
switch in our equilibrium (even for negligible switching costs), with moderate
switching costs, a fraction of them might be poached by very aggressive oers
by the backbones. We do not feel, however, that this would aect our con-
clusions in any substantial way. Moderate switching costs constitute in fact
a mixed blessing for a small player, as they make its installed base an easy
target for a large backbone that degrades interconnection. A ner modeling
of installed base behavior would be interesting in its own right, but in the
context of our analysis, it would complicate substantially the description of
equilibrium without, we believe, altering the main insights.
5.3 Modeling the quality of interconnection
In this subsection, which can be omitted without loss of continuity, we dis-
cuss two interpretations of the parameter : compatibility of standards and
interface capacity.
The rst interpretation corresponds to a compatibility decision. Com-
patibility levels however may be intermediate between 0 and 1, as connec-
tion standards may allow some services but not others. For instance, the
backbones may be compatible for standard Internet usage, but not for some
or all the new, delay-sensitive services such as Internet telephony or video-
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conferencing, because one of the backbones refuses to oer premium inter-
connection services to the other or develops proprietary standards.
The second interpretation of the quality parameter  refers to the capacity
of the interface (or of the links near the interface). A lower capacity translates
into delays and losses of packets.
To illustrate this, consider the followingmodel of \discouragement", where
the gross utility of a connection, w, is randomly distributed according to a
distribution F (:); the parameter v can in that case be reinterpreted as the
expected gross utility:
v = E [w] =
Z
+1
0
w dF (w) :
The utility is equal to the expected gross utility minus the average delay at
the interface. Assuming that the interface has capacity  and faces a trac t,
and positing a M-M-1 process for interface trac, the average disutility of
delay is k= (, t), where k is a constant. Given the existence of a delay, only
those connections with gross utility w  w

will actually be made, with
w

=
k
, t
: (7)
The o-net trac is therefore
t = 2 (
1
+ q
1
) (
2
+ q
2
) [1, F (w

)] : (8)
Conditions (7) and (8) together dene the threshold w

as a function of
the capacity  and of the potential exchange trac, T = 2 (
1
+ q
1
) (
2
+ q
2
).
Using equation (1), the average value for a customer of backbone i with type
 is
 + v (
i
+ q
i
) +  (
j
+ q
j
) ; (9)
where the \quality" of the interconnection,
 =
R
+1
w

(w , w

) dF (w)
R
+1
0
wdF (w)
;
is now endogenous and depends positively on the capacity  but negatively
on trac and thus on the two backbones' customer bases. If the interface
capacity is innite ( = +1), then w

= 0 and (9) coincides with (1) with
 = 1 (perfect interconnection), whereas if the interface capacity is equal
to zero ( = 0), then w

= +1 and (9) coincides with (1) with  = 0.
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More generally, given (q
1
; q
2
), the choice of interface capacity  2 [0;+1)
determines a quality of interconnection  2 [0; 1], with a higher  generating
a higher .
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This modied model with volume-dependent interconnection quality has
the same avor as the basic one, but is mathematically more complex. Each
backbone's marginal prot with respect to output includes an extra, nonlin-
ear term, which represents the marginal impact of adding one more consumer
to one's network on the quality of interconnection. In a static setting such
as the one we consider here, the thrust of the analysis is the same as before
and amounts to focusing on the strategic choice of the interface capacity
. The additional eect, which could be labelled the \marginal degradation
cost of output expansion", however induces backbones to reduce their expan-
sion relative to a situation in which their output has no impact on interface
congestion.
The marginal degradation costs is not the same for both backbones. In-
deed, an increase in the size of the bigger backbone degrades the interface
quality less than an increase in the size of the smaller backbone, since a higher
fraction of messages issued by customers of the smaller backbone are directed
o net.
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Another interesting implication of the marginal degradation term
is that even equal-size backbones may want to restrict the capacity of their
interface in order to reduce the intensity of competition for new customers.
Last, tipping need not arise even if network externalities are strong (v > 1=2).
When market shares become quite unequal, o-net trac is reduced and so
the quality of interconnection is restored (provided the interface capacity is
not too small), which counteracts the tendency toward tipping.
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The endogeneity of  thus provides an additional way for the dominant backbone to
alter the quality of the interface: it can degrade this quality not only by reducing the
interface capacity , but also by increasing its customer base 
1
+ q
1
.
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Using (9), this term, per new customer of network i, is
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6 Oligopoly and targeted degradation
The preceding analysis emphasized the key consequences of the dierence in
the size of the installed bases: the bigger backbone has an incentive to de-
grade the quality of interconnection. Building on this insight, we now analyze
the possible adverse eect of a merger that creates a \large" backbone, start-
ing from an initial situation where backbones are symmetric in size. Specif-
ically, we assume that, initially, four equal-sized backbones
41
(
i
= =4)
compete for new customers. We briey analyze the competition between
these four backbones, and then study the outcome of a merger between two of
them: a merger between backbones 1 and 4 creates a \dominant backbone",
which we will label backbone 1, with an installed base of size =2, competing
with two smaller backbones (backbones 2 and 3), each with an installed base
of size =4.
For computational simplicity, we assume that each backbone may unilat-
erally and costlessly choose to be compatible with each of the other back-
bones (
ij
= 0 or 1, and F (1) = F (0) = 0). As above, compatibility requires
cooperation of both parties: the eective level of connectivity between two
backbones is the minimum of the levels chosen by each backbone. Last, and
as we will later discuss in some detail, we will allow the backbones to limit
the trac at the interfaces even when they are compatible.
We now successively consider the no-merger situation and the alternative
post-merger strategies.
6.1 No merger: Competition among equals
We rst show that backbones have an incentive to maintain the quality of in-
terconnection in the pre-merger situation. Since each backbone has a smaller
installed base than the combined installed base of its rivals, maintaining a
high quality of interconnection has a positive impact on both the demand
(demand expansion eect) and on its relative perceived quality, compared
with that of the rivals (quality dierentiation eect).
With four equal-size backbones competing with each other, the analysis
41
We have chosen this initial situation in part because it bears a vague ressemblance
to the actual backbone market with its four dominant players, but also for analytical
convenience. Furthermore, with four backbones the eect of a merger is to create a large
backbone with a still moderate market share, so that our results are not biased towards
degradation of connectivity. A more \realistic" analysis would not only take into account
the dierence in the sizes of the networks, but also the presence of a competitive fringe.
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is similar to that of the duopoly case and the prot of backbone i is
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As before, decreasing the quality of interconnection with backbone j has
two eects on backbone i. It decreases total demand, because both backbones
provide access to fewer customers. It also lowers the quality of backbone i
compared to the quality of the other two backbones, while not aecting the
quality dierence with backbone j. As a consequence, in the absence of cost
saving, there are no incentives to degrade the interconnection with a single
other backbone.
Similarly, degrading interconnection with several backbones is not prof-
itable, as the demand reduction is even larger than before, and the quality
dierentiation eect still plays against the degrading backbone which oers
access to a smaller fraction of the installed base than the others. As a result,
no backbone has an incentive to degrade connectivity:
Proposition 4 In the absence of a merger, all backbones prefer a high qual-
ity of connection: 

ij
= 1 for all i and j. They obtain identical prots


i
= (1, v) (q

i
)
2
, with
q

i
=
1, c+ v
5 (1, v)
:
Proof. See appendix C.
6.2 Possible strategies for a dominant backbone
In the post-merger situation the two small backbones still have incentives to
maintain a good connectivity but the dominant backbone may not want to.
To analyze this issue, we consider three possible strategies for the dominant
backbone:
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Accommodation:The dominant backbone maintains a good intercon-
nection with the other two backbones;
Global degradation: The dominant backbone decides not to intercon-
nect at all;
42
The analysis and the conditions derived below are consistent with the requirement
that equilibria are stable.
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Targeted degradation: The dominant backbone refuses interconnection
with one of the small backbones and furthermore limits the interface
capacity with the other backbone, to discourage it from oering tran-
sit services { that is, from transmitting messages from the targeted
backbone's clients to the dominant backbone.
Our analysis shows that the merger creates incentives to pursue a tar-
geted degradation strategy. A global degradation strategy is not protable:
it reduces again the demand and does not yield any competitive advantage to
the new entity over its rivals, whose combined installed base has the same size
as the new entity's. But a targeted degradation strategy can be protable.
If the other backbone does not provide any transit services, the degradation
strategy creates an asymmetry between the dominant backbone (who can of-
fer access to three-fourth of the installed base) and the target (who can oer
access to only half of the installed base); this particular degradation strat-
egy thus generates a positive quality dierentiation eect for the dominant
backbone, which can be sucient to make the strategy protable. More-
over, by limiting its interface capacity with the non-targeted backbone, the
dominant backbone can eectively discourage this backbone from providing
transit services to the target.
Constraining the interface with the non-targeted backbone: an illustration.
To illustrate the limitation of the interface with the non-targeted backbone,
let us return to the interpretation of the interconnection quality parameter
as the interface capacity (see section 5.3). Assume for simplicity that all
messages have the same value v (so w  v). Let  denote the capacity of
the interface and t
ij
denote the potential trac between backbones i and
j (t
ij
 2(
j
+ q
j
)(
j
+ q
j
)). Suppose that t
12
+ t
13
  > t
12
, and that
network 1 refuses to interconnect with network 3. In the absence of transit,
the value of a message net of the delay cost is v, k=(, t
12
), which is close
to v (that is ,  = 1, k= [v (, t
12
)] is close to 1) if k is small. In contrast,
in the presence of transit, the equilibrium total trac at the interface, t,
is lower than t
12
+ t
13
and is such that interconnection with network 1 is
worthless: v , k= (, t) = 0. In other words, the gain from connectivity
is completely dissipated by the customers' competition for sparse interface
capacity. Hence, transit is equivalent (in utilities, although not in outcomes)
to the absence of interconnection between networks 1 and 2 (
12
= 0).
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6.3 Post-merger: accommodation versus targeted de-
gradation
Building on the previous insights, it is intuitive that the small backbones
have no incentives to degrade their connectivity. Similarly, since the large
backbone's installed base has exactly the same size as the total installed
base of the other two backbones, it is not a protable strategy to degrade
the quality of interconnection with both other backbones:
Proposition 5 After the merger:
i. the small backbones prefer to maintain connectivity;
ii. the dominant backbone does not want to pursue a global degradation
strategy.
Proof. See appendix D.
It follows from this proposition that the dominant backbone's relevant
strategies consist in either maintaining connectivity with both smaller back-
bones (accommodation strategy), or selectively degrading connectivity with
one of them (targeted degradation strategy). The accommodation strategy
increases the total demand (demand expansion eect) but eliminates any
competitive advantage that the dominant backbone could derive from its
bigger installed base.
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In contrast, a targeted degradation strategy poten-
tially gives the dominant backbone a competitive advantage over the targeted
backbone, whose installed base is only half the size of the dominant back-
bone's installed base.
To x ideas, assume that backbone 1 does not interconnect with back-
bone 3 (
13
= 0) but maintains a high quality of interface with backbone 2
(
12
= 1) as long as this backbone does not oer transit to backbone 3 { that
is, the capacity of this interface is such that its quality is excellent if back-
bone 2 does not oer transit to backbone 3, but abysmal otherwise. Oering
transit would thus amount for backbone 2 to degrade its connection with
the dominant backbone and result in the same situation as with the global
degradation strategy, where each backbone has access to half of the installed
43
In the Cournot-like set-up of the present model, the dominant backbone gets less than
in the pre-merger situation if he adopts the accommodation strategy. This standard feature
of Cournot oligopoly models (see Salant, Switzer & Reynolds (1983)), where quantities are
strategic substitute and a merger always benets rivals but not necessarily the merging
rms, may not hold in alternative models. For example, with Bertrand competition among
dierentiated backbones, prices tend to be strategic complements and a merger can benet
both the rivals and the merging rms.
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base customers; it would therefore decrease the demand for the services of
backbone 2 and remove any competitive advantage of this backbone vis-a-vis
the other ones. In contrast, by refusing transit and thus maintaining a good
connectivity with the dominant backbone:
 backbone 2 has access to the entire installed base, since it has a good
connection with the other two backbones;
 the dominant backbone has access to three fourths of the installed base,
its own customers plus those of backbone 2;
 the target, backbone 3, has access to only half of the installed base
customers.
This strongly suggests, and the analysis conrms, that in equilibrium
backbone 2 prefers not to oer transit services to backbone 3.
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Therefore,
for the dominant backbone, the targeted degradation strategy has a negative
impact on demand but generates a competitive advantage over the targeted
backbone. We show in appendix E that this competitive advantage may
be so large that in equilibrium the targeted backbone does not attract any
new customer (q

3
= 0) and the dominant backbone gains from adopting this
targeted degradation strategy.
Proposition 6 If v=(1 , c) belongs to the interval (1; 4(1 , 2v)=(1 + v))
(which is not empty if network externalities are large enough, i.e., if v > 1=3),
then the targeted degradation strategy prevents the targeted backbone from
attracting any new customer and is protable for the dominant backbone.
Proof. See appendix E.
The targeted degradation strategy can still be optimal for the dominant
network even if does not prevent the target from attracting some new con-
sumers. It would be even more appealing to the dominant backbone if the
quality of interconnection were costly.
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This also suggests that backbone 2 may refuse transit even if the dominant backbone
does not limit the capacity of its interface: oering transit to backbone 3 would still remove
any quality disadvantage for that backbone and thus lead to more eective competition
among the three backbones { although backbone 1 would still suer from a lower perceived
quality. A detailed analysis of the transit decision would however require a careful modeling
of the negotiation between the two small backbones and is beyond the scope of the present
analysis.
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6.3.1 Discussion: the non-targeted backbone's refusal to provide
transit
The reader may object that our analysis is static and might therefore over-
estimate backbone 2's willingness to provide transit services to the target,
as backbone 2 may fear to be the next target for a degradation of connec-
tivity. The dominant backbone could avoid this problem if it could commit
itself to maintaining connectivity with the remaining backbone.
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Even if
backbone 1 cannot commit not to degrade its connection with backbone 2
tomorrow (i.e., cannot sign a non-aggression pact), it may well refrain from
targeting backbone 2 once backbone 3 is weakened; indeed, the targeted de-
gradation strategy gives a competitive advantage to backbone 2 and thus
dissipates today part of the initial asymmetry in installed bases.
To see this, suppose for example that there are two periods and that
all agents (rms and consumers) behave myopically; also, for the sake of
the argument, assume that the rst-period targeted degradation eliminates
backbone 3, who is no longer present in the second period (it may for exam-
ple be forced to bankruptcy if it fails to attract enough new customers).
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Backbone 2 oers a better quality in the rst period, since it provides access
to all subscribers, whereas backbone 1 does not oer access to backbone 3's
installed base customers; its market share among date 1 new customers is
therefore higher than that of backbone 1: denoting by q^
t
i
the equilibrium
number of customers of backbone i in period 1 under targeted degradation,
we have (see appendix F)
q^
t
2
, q^
t
1
=
v
4 (1, v)
> 0:
While this does not suce to erase entirely the dierence in installed base,
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it does dissipate part of it: both installed bases are larger in the second
45
In that case, it could even auction o the privilege of not being the target in the rst
period.
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Two alternative hypotheses could be made about the fate of the =4 customers in its
installe base that backbone 3 liberates:
a. We could assume that backbones 1 and 2 each buy half of them before competing
at date 2. This would reinforce our conclusions as the installed base
^
 increases.
b. We could assume that these consumers go back on the market at date 2. Then,
the analysis is made more complicated by the fact that it would be unreasonable to
assume that their types are uniformly distributed on [0; 1], since the fact that they
have already chosen to connect is proof that they value connectivity.
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The no-tipping condition v < 1=2 implies q
t
2
  q
t
1
< 
1
  
2
= =4.
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period (
^

i
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i
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), but their dierence is smaller:
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Appendix F shows that the bigger backbone does not have an incentive to
degrade connectivity in the second period; that is,
^
 < 

(
^
) where 

(
^
) is
the threshold, characterized in our duopoly analysis, below which degrading
connectivity becomes unprotable for the bigger backbone.
This simple exercise is only meant to convey the intuition. A more rig-
orous analysis should allow for the fact that rms and consumers take into
account the evolution of the industry in their decisions. However, a number
of factors suggest that the argument is robust. First, two factors make the
degradation of the connection less appealing in the second period: the total
installed base is bigger, and the dierence in installed base is lower. It can
be checked that the latter eect is in fact sucient to deter the degradation
strategy.
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Second, backbone 2 can decide to further expand its rst-period
capacity so as to ensure that degrading connectivity is not optimal for back-
bone 1 in later periods. To be sure, backbone 1 might choose to counteract
this by expanding its own capacity in the rst period. However, there is an
asymmetry here, since any expansion in capacity in the rst period increases
the total installed base in the second period, which in turn tends to make a
degradation strategy less appealing.
49
And, more important, backbone 2's
incentive to avoid degradation is likely to be higher than backbone 1's in-
centive to degrade, since degrading connectivity reduces total demand and,
therefore, the overall industry protability.
50
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The threshold 

() increases with , as noted in our analysis of the duopoly situa-
tion, but we actually have here
^
 < 

(3=4)

< 


^


.
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Suppose for example that, starting from a situation where the second-period installed
bases
^

1
= 
1
+ q^
t
1
and
^

2
= 
2
+ q^
t
2
would exactly satisfy
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2
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+
^

2

,
backbone 2 increases its capacity q^
2
by  so as to avoid degradation in the second period;
then, backbone 1 would have to increase its own rst-period capacity by more than  to
restore its incentives to degrade connectivity in the second period, since

^
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+ 

 
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+ 

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Suppose for example that, due for instance to a larger initial dierence in installed
bases,
^
 is slightly larger than 

(
^
) if rms behave myopically. Backbone 2 can then
expand its capacity in order to move date 2 dierence in installed bases in the region
^
 < 

(
^
), where connectivity is maintained in the second period; conversely, backbone
1 can expand its capacity so as to remain in the region where connecticity would be
is degraded. However, since aggregate prot jumps up when connectivity is restored,
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Figure 5: Multihoming
Other reasons may induce backbone 2 to refuse to provide transit services
to backbone 3. First, giving transit may impose too much strain on its
network. Second, even if it anticipates to be the next target once backbone
3 is no longer an eective competitor, backbone 2 may still prefer to refuse
transit and thus weaken backbone 3, since this yields a much higher prot in
the rst-period: If it refuses transit, backbone 2 oers the maximal quality of
service and is the only one to do so, whereas providing transit services leads to
a less protable situation, where three equally low-quality backbones compete
head-to-head for new customers. Last, backbone 2 may fear to become the
victim of another targeted degradation if the rst one is not successful. For
example, backbone 2's lower protability when it oers transit may weaken
its nancial health to the point that a targeted degradation would provoke
bankruptcy, thereby making this strategy more appealing for the dominant
backbone.
To conclude, we do not wish to argue that targeted degradation is always
protable for the dominant backbone, but simply that such a backbone will
nd it is an appealing and robust strategy in a variety of circumstances.
7 Multihoming
Currently some of the largest ISPs \multihome", that is are customers of
several backbones. Multihoming provides insurance both against the break-
down of connection to one's backbone and against the breakdown of one's
backbone 2's incentive to get out of the degradation region is necessarily larger than
backbone 1's incentive to remain in it.
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backbone
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. For the same reasons, some of rms that are large users of
the Internet multihome on several ISPs, which may be linked to dierent
backbones. Multihoming is represented on gure 5, where Internet backbone
provider 1, the dominant backbone, has degraded its connection with the
small IBP (this is represented by the bold vertical double line). The ISP is a
customer of both backbones, and enjoys perfect connection with the clients
of both IBPs. This section shows that, in the context of our model, the
degradation of interconnection by a dominant backbone would in general be
protable even if customers multihome.
Multihoming might impair a dominance-enhancing degradation strategy
in two ways. First, pre-existing multihoming by some installed base cus-
tomers softens the impact of the degradation strategy on both the dominant
and targeted networks. It makes it less costly for the dominant network to
reduce the connectivity of its own customers with those of its rivals, and, as
long as the dierence in installed bases remains the same, it has no impact
on the relative quality of the networks. Section 7.1 conrms this intuition
and shows that, in general, pre-existing multihoming by customers in the
installed base encourages degradation.
Second, customers, whether new or \singlehoming" members of the in-
stalled base, may choose to multihome in order to increase connectivity in
the presence of degradation. Section 7.2 shows that the smaller backbones
cannot use this fact in order to circumvent the degradation of the connec-
tion. In order to induce multihoming, the smaller backbone must expand
output and this leads to a decrease in prices which, in many cases, will lead
to a decrease in its prot. While we certainly do not wish to claim that
incentives for multihoming are never increased by degradation, this analy-
sis clearly shows that multihoming need not impair the protability of the
degradation strategy.
Before embarking in the analysis of these two points, we should note that
we are overstating in three ways the consequences of multihoming. First, we
assume that multihoming does not increase the costs of the customer, apart
from the fact that it must pay both backbones. We thereby assume away
one of the main impediments to its widespread use as a defense mechanism
| it is technologically costly:
1. The use of the Border Gateway Protocol version 4 (BGP4), which must
be run by ISPs or end users who multihome, requires very qualied
sta and is prohibitively expensive for smaller clients. Multihoming
51
The rst but not the second type of insurance can also be obtained by having multiple
links to the same backbone.
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may also impose routing costs on the backbones, which may charge the
multihoming customer.
2. There are transaction costs associated with multiple relationships.
3. Connecting to multiple backbones implies a loss of returns to scale:
because the cost of a connection is less than proportional to its band-
width, splitting one's trac among several backbones increases the
total connection cost.
Second, by assuming that multihoming ensures perfect connectivity, even
in the presence of complete degradation of the connection between the back-
bones, we overstate its eectiveness. In practice, the multihoming client does
not control the routing of inbound (return) trac, and therefore multihoming
is only partly successful in alleviating degradation.
Third, if the dominant backbone perceived multihoming as a threat, it
could impede its use by a number of techniques such as a refusal to deal
with multihoming customers or to oer BGP4. These overt techniques could
possibly trigger antitrust action, and so more subtle techniques such as high
charges for the use of BGP4, volume discounts (which imply a greater loss
of returns to scale), and the slowing down of connections to multihoming
customers,
52
would probably be more eective.
7.1 Pre-existing multihoming
In this subsection, we assume that, for reasons exogenous to the model,
some users in the installed base already multihome before degradation takes
place, and we explore the consequences of this fact on the incentives of the
dominant backbone. We assume that the new customers and that the non
already multihoming users in the installed base cannot multihome. This
assumption is lifted in subsection 7.2.
7.1.1 The duopoly case
We use the framework of section 4, and we modify it by assuming that by
part of the customers in the installed based multihome. More precisely, we
assume that the installed base, still of size  = 
1
+ 
2
, is divided into
 a fraction 
i
,=2 of single-homers attached to each backbone i = 1; 2
with, as above, 
1
 
2
,
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In this respect, the dominant network could build a reputation for not being cooper-
ative with the upgrading of connections to multihoming customers.
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 a fraction  of multi-homers attached to both backbones.
This implies that the total installed base has the same size  = 
1
+
2
as
before and that the installed base advantage of backbone 1 is still  = 
1
,
2
.
The number of new customers in the Cournot equilibrium is given by
q

i
(; ) = q

i
(0; ) +

2
(1,
3(1, v)
3, v(2 + )
)
where q

i
(0; ) is the no multihoming equilibrium quantity of equation (5).
Because 3(1 , v)  3 , v(2 + ), for given  the presence of multihoming
increases the equilibrium quantities (strictly if  < 1): indeed, multihom-
ing makes both backbones more attractive to new customers and shifts the
demand curve outwards.
We can prove that the results of section 4 extend to multihoming by the
installed base:
Proposition 7 In the presence of multihoming by the installed base, the
larger backbone prefers a lower quality of interconnection than the smaller
backbone: 

1
 

2
with a strict inequality if F () = 0 for all  and 

2
> 0.
Moreover, its preferred quality of interconnection decreases when its installed
base advantage increases: keeping the total installed base  constant, 

1
is a
(weakly) decreasing function of .
The proof is similar
53
to that of proposition 1.
We now turn to the impact of the extent of multihoming (measured by )
on equilibrium. The dierence in quality
s
1
, s
2
= v(1, )[
1
, 
2
+ q

1
(; ), q

2
(; )]
is independent of . Thus, multihoming has no impact on the quality dier-
ential created by degradation. In contrast, as we have already noted, multi-
homing reduces the impact on total demand of a decrease in connectivity. It
is therefore not surprising that multihoming may encourage degradation:
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In order to show that the equilibrium  is decrasing in , write q

1
(; ) =  () +
() + (): Then
1
2
@
2
q

1
(; )
@@
= ( ()())
0
+ (()())
0
+(()
2
)
0
:
The proof is then similar to that of footnote 35, with the added statement that ()()
is decreasing as both  and  are.
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Proposition 8 Under duopoly, if connectivity is costless (F () = 0), the
equilibrium quality of interconnection of the backbones decreases with the ex-
tent of installed base multihoming .
The proof
54
relies on the fact that when F () = 0 the quality that maxi-
mizes the prot of a backbone is also the quality that maximizes its equilib-
rium quantity. The analysis is more complex with costly connectivity, and
we have been unable to generalize this proposition or to nd a counterexam-
ple, although we have been able to show the partial result summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 9 Under duopoly, with costly connectivity, there exits an ,
maybe equal to 0 or 1, such that the equilibrium quality of interconnection is
equal to 1 for    and is smaller than 1 for  > .
Proof. To show the result, it is sucient to prove that if 

1
is strictly
smaller than 1 for some , it is also strictly smaller for all 
0
> . Therefore,
assume that we have (with obvious notation)


1
(; ), F ()  

1
(; 1), F (1):
Because q

1
and therefore 

1
are strictly increasing in  for  < 1, we have


1
(
0
; ),F () > 

1
(; ),F (). Because q

1
and therefore 

1
do not depend
on  when  = 1, we have 

1
(; 1), F (1) = 

1
(
0
;  = 1), F (1). Therefore


1
(
0
; ), F () > 

1
(; 1), F (1);
which proves the result.
In exactly the same way, we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 10 It  only takes values 0 and 1, then under duopoly the equi-
librium quality of connection is decreasing in .
7.1.2 Targeted degradation
Turning to the framework of section 6, we assume that the installed base,
whose total size is still , is divided into:
 ( , )=2 = =2, =2 single-homers attached to the dominant back-
bone (backbone 1),
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It is a straightforward revealed preference, based on the fact that @
2
q

i
=@@ is nega-
tive. This proves that the  that maximizes q

i
decreases with . When F () = 0, this is
sucient to prove the result. When F () is not constant, a standard revealed preference
argument would require us to rst prove @
2
(q

i
)
2
=@@ < 0, which is not always true.
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 ( , 2)=4 = =4, =2 single-homers attached to the targeted back-
bone (backbone 3),
  multi-homers attached to both the dominant and the targeted back-
bones (backbones 1 and 3),


4
of single-homers attached to the non-targeted small backbone (back-
bone 2),
with  < =2. We could assume that there is some multihoming between
backbone 2 and backbones 1 and 3, but it would be irrelevant as long as
backbone 2 keeps perfect connectivity with the other two backbones.
It is straightforward to show that if the dominant backbone adopts the
accommodation strategy
55
(
ij
= 1), then the other two follow suit. The
prot function of each backbone i is the same as in section 6.3 and the
equilibrium is the same as above: the dierence between the installed bases
is irrelevant to the new customers.
If backbone 1 opts for the global degradation strategy (
12
= 
13
= 0), one
can again prove that backbones 2 and 3 nd it optimal to interconnect (
23
=
1), and that, as in section 6, the dominant network nds accommodation
preferable to global degradation.
Consider now the strategy of targeted degradation, where, as above, back-
bone 1 does not interconnect with backbone 3 (
13
= 0), maintains a high
quality of interface with backbone 2 (
12
= 1) as long as this backbone does
not oer transit to backbone 3, and limits the capacity of the interface with
backbone 2.
As in section 6, we only consider the case where backbone 3 attracts no
new customers.
56
Then, the equilibrium is:
q^
t
1
() =
1
6
2 (1, c) + v + 2v
1, v
; (10)
q^
t
2
() =
1
12
4 (1, c) + 5v , 2v
1, v
;
55
As in section 6, we assume that the quality of connection (the 
ij
s) can only take
values 0 and 1, and F (1) = F (0) = 0.
56
When backbone 3 attracts new customers, backbone 1 benets from targeted degra-
dation when its installed base is large enough and there if a large amount of multihoming,
as long as backbone 2 does not oer transit to the targeted backbone, which is always the
case if v  1=3 (if v > 1=3, one may needs to put an upper bound on  and/or  to rule
out transit).
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and ^
t
i
() = (1, v) (q^
t
i
())
2
. Since the equilibrium prot of backbone 1
under targeted degradation increases with  while the accommodation equi-
librium prot is independent of , the targeted degradation strategy is even
more desirable than above.
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The intuition is straightforward. With mul-
tihoming s
2
, s
1
decreases, as the new customers who choose backbone 1
benet from connectivity with some of the customers of network 3. Hence,
the quality dierentiation advantage of network 2 is decreased. Furthermore,
and as in the duopoly case, the contraction in demand caused by degrada-
tion is lowered by pre-existing multihoming, since backbone 1 maintains con-
nectivity with part of the installed base of backbone 3. Both eects make
targeted degradation more attractive when part of the installed base already
multihomes.
Proposition 11 Assume v > 1=3 and  2 (1; 4(1, 2v)=(1 + v)) and that 
is \small". Then,
i. targeted degradation prevents the target from attracting any new cus-
tomer;
ii. and pre-existing multihoming raises the protability of targeted degra-
dation by the dominant backbone by
(a) reducing the demand contraction caused by degradation
(b) and by reducing the quality advantage enjoyed by the smaller non-
targeted backbone.
From equation (10) it is straightforward to prove the following corollary:
Proposition 12 Assume v > 1=3 and  2 (1; 4(1,2v)=(1+v)) and that for
i = 2; 3, a small number 
i
of consumers multihome between backbone i and
backbone 1. Assume further that any targeted backbone is unable to attract
any new customer. Then, backbone 1 will target the backbone i with the
largest 
i
.
7.2 Multihoming in response to degradation
In this subsection, we show that the smaller backbone cannot in general
defend itself against a degradation of connectivity by using the fact that new
customers and/or the non already multihoming customers of the installed
base could choose to multihome.
57
Indeed, letting the superscript a indicate accomodation, assume ^
t
1
(0)  ^
a
1
(0), we
have ^
t
1
() > ^
t
1
(0)  ^
a
1
(0) = ^
a
1
(1), which proves the result.
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7.2.1 Duopoly
We return to the framework of section 4, assuming for simplicity that there is
no pre-existing multihoming. Furthermore, we consider only cases where de-
gradation, if it occurs is extreme, so that  can only take values 0 or 1. When
 = 1, the customers have no incentive to multihome and the equilibrium
identied in section 4 is still an equilibrium.
To study the consequences of a degradation of connectivity ( = 0), we
need to introduce some new notation. Let
 
i
be the number of customers in the installed base of backbone j 6= i
who multihome on backbone i;
  be the number of new customers who multihome;
 q
i
be the number of new customers who contract only with backbone i.
Then,
s
i
= v[(q
i
+ ) + (
i
+ 
i
)]
is the quality of service for customers who singlehome with backbone i, and
s = v[q
1
+ q
2
+  + 
1
+ 
2
] = s
1
+ s
2
, v (
1
+ 
2
+ )
is the quality of service for customers who multihome. Notice that s is the
sum of the qualities of backbones 1 and 2 corrected for double counting of
connections: therefore it is smaller than or equal to s
1
+ s
2
, and strictly
smaller (s < s
1
+ s
2
) when there is multihoming.
The strategic variable selected by backbone i is the number of new con-
nections it oers
Q
i
= q
i
+ 
i
+ : (11)
In order to check whether the equilibrium quantities of equation (5) are
still equilibrium quantities when multihoming is possible, we need to show
that if the number of new connections oered by backbone 1 is xed at
Q
1
= q

1
, then backbone 2 has no incentive to oer more than Q
2
= q

2
connections, even when customers have the possibility to multihome.
When there are at the same time multihoming and singlehoming cus-
tomers, the quality adjusted prices must be the same for the three possi-
bilities
58
open to consumers: connecting with backbone 1, connecting with
58
We are assuming that both backbones attract new customers. The results still hold
in backbone 2 if excluded from the market.
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backbone 2 or multihoming. This has two important consequences. First, it
is impossible for some new customers to be unattached while others multi-
home: the marginal benet of a rst connection to backbone 2 is  +vs
2
,p
2
whereas the marginal benet of a second connection to backbone 2 is equal
to v(s , s
1
) , p
2
, and therefore smaller (since s < s
1
+ s
2
).
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Therefore, if
there is any multihoming, every customer subscribes to at least one network:
q
1
+ q
2
+  = 1: (12)
Second, the price charged by backbone 2 is equal to the value of connect-
ing to those customers reachable solely through backbone 2: p
2
= s, s
1
. As
we have seen in the preceding paragraph, all potential customers, and there
are 1 + 
1
+ 
2
of them, are connected . If the number of new connections
oered by 1 is xed at Q
1
= q

1
, the price for backbone 2's services is given
by
p
2
= v(s, s
1
) = v[(1 + 
1
+ 
2
), (
1
+ q

1
)] = v(1 + 
2
, q

1
);
and is thus independent from the number of connections oered by back-
bone 2 (provided that multihoming occurs, i.e., Q
2
> 1, q

1
).
Therefore, backbone 2 might as well oer the maximum possible number
of connections, that is 1 + 
1
, and a necessary and sucient condition for
network 2 not to induce multihoming, and therefore for (q

1
; q

2
) to be an
equilibrium is
(1, v) (q

2
)
2
 (v((1, q

1
) + 
2
), c) (1 + 
1
): (13)
A sucient, but not necessary, condition for (13) to be satised is
v[(1, q

1
) + 
2
]  c,
which is, for instance, satised if  is suciently large.
60
59
Formally,
p^ = p
1
+ p
2
  s > p
1
+ p
2
  s
1
  s
2
= 2p^
implies p^ = 0 and therefore
q
1
+ q
2
+  = 1:
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This condition can be shown to be equivalent to q

2
< 1  (q

1
+ q

2
), and an increase
in  reduces q

2
by has no impact on (q

1
+ q

2
). In particular, (q

1
; q

2
) is an equilibrium
whenever q

2
= 0.
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Note nally that condition (13) is too stringent if only a fraction of the
customers have the technological know-how to, say, master BGP4. If this
were the case, backbone 2's margin, p
2
, c, in the multihoming region is
still the same but the potential market for backbone 2 is then smaller than
(1 + 
1
).
Proposition 13 Under duopoly, the possibility of multihoming in response
to degradation does not perturb the equilibrium if condition (13) holds.
Proposition 13 understates the extent of multihoming when it is both
costless and allowed by the dominant backbone. First, we have assumed that
the consumers' willingness to pay for access is positive ( 2 [0; 1]). However,
a consumer with a negative
61
willingness to pay for access might subscribe
at a strictly positive price once the network externality is accounted for.
Therefore, the proposition, as it stands, relies on a distributional assumption.
Second, we have assumed that all consumers have the same valuation of
connectivity. In practice some consumers value connectivity more than others
and even in a non-competitive industry, backbones would not perfectly dis-
criminate on the basis of the consumers' willingness to pay for connectivity.
To see this, suppose that within each installed base, a \very small" (so that
their presence does not aect the above analysis of the equilibrium) fraction
of customers have a higher valuation for connectivity, given by (1 + ) v with
 > 0. Intuitively, for  large enough, those customers will want to \multi-
home", that is, to subscribe to the rival's backbone as well, even though they
are already part of one backbone' s installed base. However, the customers
who initially belong to the smaller backbone's installed base will be the most
eager to multihome, and, as  increases from 0, those customers will be the
rst ones to be willing to multihome. More precisely, they will decide to
\multihome" on backbone 1 as soon as
s^
1
 (1 + ) v (
1
+ q
1
)  p
1
= p^+ v (
1
+ q
1
) ;
that is, when
  
2
=
p^
v (
1
+ q
1
)
:
Similarly, the customers that initially belong to the larger installed base will
be willing to multihome only when
  
1
=
p^
v (
2
+ q
2
)
> 
2
:
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This does not necessarily imply that such consumers positively do not want to be
connected, but rather that the private costs of connection (for instance, buying a computer
and learning how to use it) are larger than the benets that they receive from subscribing
to the network.
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Proposition 14 Add to the basic model a small proportion of customers
with a higher valuation for connectivity ((1 + )v instead of v). There exists
an interval (
2
; 
1
) such that for any  in that interval, in the presence of
degradation, these consumers
i. select the dominant backbone if unattached;
ii. multihome to the dominant backbone if they are part of the smaller
backbone's installed base;
iii. do not multihome to the smaller backbone if they are part of the domi-
nant backbone's installed base.
(If  < 
2
, no multihoming occurs. If  > 
1
, all the consumers with a high
valuation for connectivity multihome.)
7.2.2 Targeted degradation
We now turn to our model of targeted degradation, and show that, in this case
also, there is no multihoming at equilibrium. We keep the same hypotheses as
in section 6: connectivity is either perfect (
ij
= 0) or totally degraded (
ij
=
0). Furthermore, we only consider cases where under targeted degradation
backbone 3 does not sell to any new customer.
If the dominant backbone pursues a strategy of global accommodation,
multihoming can bring no connectivity benet, and the equilibrium of sec-
tion 6 is still an equilibrium. We now show that this conclusion is also valid
with targeted degradation.
In the non multihoming equilibrium, the benet that the marginal cus-
tomer would receive from signing onto network 3 must be less that c, oth-
erwise network 3 could expand its capacity by a small amount, attract one
customer and increase its prot. Therefore
1, q

1
, q

2
+ v


2
+ q

2

 c.
With multihoming, the price that backbone 3 would receive would be s, s
1
,
the value of the extra service it provides, where
s = s
2
= v(q

1
+ q

2
+ q
3
+ ) = v(1 + )
is the quality of universal connection. Because s
1
= v(q

1
+ q

2
+ 3=4),
p
3
= v

1 +

4
, q

1
, q

2

 c, v


4

, vq

2
< c,
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and backbone 3 has no incentives to expand to induce multihoming.
Proposition 15 The possibility of multihoming in response to degradation
of connectivity does not change the parameter values for which a targeted
degradation equilibrium arises.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
The prot function 

i
= (1, v) (q

i
)
2
is convex in , since q

i
is nonnegative
and convex.
62
Therefore, if maintaining connectivity is costless, the only
relevant choices for backbone 1 are  = 0 and  = 1. The former is optimal
if q

1
is higher for  = 0 than for  = 1, that is, if
2 (1, c) + v
3, 2v
+
v
1, 2v
>
2 (1, c) + 2v
3 (1, v)
;
or
 >
1, 2v
v

2 (1, c) + 2v
3 (1, v)
,
2 (1, c) + v
3, 2v

=
1, 2v
3 (1, v) (3, 2v)
[2 (1, c) + (3, v)] = 

:
Last, it can be checked that the functions
1 2v
(1 v)(3 2v)
and
(3 v)(1 2v)
(1 v)(3 2v)
are
both decreasing in v over the range [0; 1=2], so that the threshold 

decreases
with v.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Note that the equilibrium gross prots are given by 

i
= (1, v) (q

i
)
2
where
q

i
is of the form  () +  (), with both  and   nonnegative and non-
increasing in .
i) Proof that 

1
 

 

2
: DeneG (; ) =  (

1
, F )+(1, ) (

2
, F ).
We have:
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q

i
is of the form  () +  ()
i
, where both  and  are convex in .
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@2
G
@@
=
@
2
[ (

1
, F ) + (1, ) (

2
, F )]
@@
=
@ [

1
, 

2
]
@
= (1, v)
@

( () +  ())
2
, ( (),  ())
2

@
= (1, v)
@ [4 ()  ()]
@
 0;
since   is a nonincreasing function of . A revealed preference argument
then establishes that  () = argmax

G (; ) (weakly) increases with , and
thus (applying this to  = 0; 1=2 and 1), 

1
 

 

2
.
ii) Proof that @

=@  0: Similarly:
@
2
[

1
+ 

2
, 2F ]
@@
=
@
2

( () +  ())
2
+ ( (),  ())
2
, 2F

@@
= 2
@
2
[ 
2
() + 
2
()
2
]
@@
= 4
@ [
2
()]
@
 0;
where the last inequality stems from the fact that  is nonnegative and non-
increasing in . The conclusion then follows again from a standard revealed
preference argument.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Backbone i's prot is

i
=
"
1, q
i
,
X
j 6=i
q
j
+ v
 

4
+ q
i
+
X
j 6=i

ij


4
+ q
j

!
, c
#
q
i
;
and its best response thus satises
2 (1, v) q
i
+
X
j 6=i
(1, 
ij
v) q
j
= 1, c +
 
1 +
X
j 6=i

ij
!
v
4
; (A. 1)
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while equilibrium prots from new customers are as before directly related
to the equilibrium quantities (

i
= (1, v) (q

i
)
2
).
Degrading the connectivity between i and k, say, decreases the demand
for both i and k without creating any advantage for one over the other, and
furthermore creates an advantage for their rivals. This is reected in con-
ditions (A:1), which show that decreasing 
ik
adversely aects the response
functions of backbones i and k in the same way and does not aect the
other backbones' responses; as a result, backbone i's equilibrium capacity
and prot decreases. If for example all connectivity levels but 
ik
are perfect,
backbone i's equilibrium capacity, as a function of 
ik
, is given by
q

i
=
1, c+ (1 + 3
ik
)
v
4
5 (1, v) + 3 (1, 
ik
v)
;
and increases with 
ik
. By inspection, it can be checked that all other degra-
dation strategies are non protable as well. Therefore, in equilibrium, all 
ij
are equal to 1, and the equilibrium prots and capacities are the same for all
four backbones.
D Proof of Proposition 5
The proof follows the same line as for the previous proposition and we only
sketch it here. Backbone i's prot is (for i 6= j = 2; 3)

i
=

1, q
i
, q
1
, q
j
+ v


4
+ q
i
+ 
1i


2
+ q
1

+ 
ij


4
+ q
j

, c

q
i
;
whereas the dominant backbone's prot is

1
=

1, q
1
, q
2
, q
3
+ v


2
+ q
1
+ 
12


4
+ q
2

+ 
13


4
+ q
3

, c

q
1
:
Best responses thus satisfy
2 (1, v) q
1
+ (1, 
12
v) q
2
+ (1, 
13
v) q
3
= 1, c +
v
2
+ (
12
+ 
13
)
v
4
;
2 (1, v) q
i
+ (1, 
12
v) q
1
+ (1, 
23
v) q
j
= 1, c+ 
12
v
2
+ (1 + 
23
)
v
4
;
and, again, 

i
= (1, v) (q

i
)
2
.
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i. Degrading the connectivity between the two small backbones (
23
= 0)
adversely aects their response functions, does not aect the dominant
backbone's behavior and is not protable for them. Degrading the con-
nectivity between, say, backbones 1 and 2, aects the reaction function
of backbone 2 more than the reaction function of backbone 1 (and does
not aect the other small backbone's response function), and is thus
even less protable for backbone 2.
ii. Degrading the two connections with the small backbones adversely af-
fects all response functions. If 
23
= 1 and 
12
= 
13
= 0, the domi-
nant backbone's equilibrium capacity is then given by (assuming that
v  1=3, otherwise tipping would occur, yielding q
1
= 0):
q
g
1
=
(1, 3v)

1, c+
v
2

2 (2, 6v + 3v
2
)
;
where the superscript g stand for \global degradation" while if 
12
=

13
= 
23
= 1, it is given by (with the superscript a standing for
\accommodation")
q
a
1
=
1, c+ v
4 (1, v)
:
It is straightforward to check that q
g
1
< q
a
1
, and thus that the dominant
backbone prefers to maintain connectivity.
E Proof of Proposition 6
Consider now the strategy of targeted degradation, where backbone 1 does
not interconnect with backbone 3 (
13
= 0) but maintains a high quality of
interface with backbone 2 (
12
= 1) as long as this backbone does not oer
transit to backbone 3.
Oering transit would amount for backbone 2 to revert to same situation
as with global degradation (
23
= 1 but 
12
= 
13
= 0). If instead backbone
2 does not oer transit services, then 
12
= 
23
= 1 and 
13
= 0 and the
prots are given by:

1
=

1, q
1
, q
2
, q
3
+ v

3
4
+ q
1
+ q
2

, c

q
1
;

2
= [1, q
1
, q
2
, q
3
+ v ( + q
1
+ q
2
+ q
3
), c] q
2
;

3
=

1, q
1
, q
2
, q
3
+ v


2
+ q
2
+ q
3

, c

q
3
:
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Since it is perfectly connected, backbone 2 now enjoys both a larger de-
mand a quality advantage over the other two backbones; as a result, it can be
checked that its equilibrium capacity and prot is higher than in the previous
case (global degradation). Backbone 2 thus chooses not to oer transit.
Backbone 3 is the least well connected, as it has no access to the dominant
backbone's installed base. As a result, its equilibrium capacity and prot are
the lowest among the three backbones. It may even be unable to attract
any new customer (i.e. q
3
= 0 in equilibrium); straightforward computations
show that this is the case when
v
4
>
(1, 2v) (1, c)
1 + v
: (A. 2)
Then, letting the superscript t stand for \targeted degradation" the dom-
inant backbone's equilibrium capacity is
q^
t
1
=
1
6
2 (1, c) + v
1, v
;
q^
t
2
=
1
12
4 (1, c) + 5v
1, v
;
and as before ^
t
1
= (1, v) (q^
t
1
)
2
. Backbone 1 thus prefers the targeted de-
gradation strategy to accommodation if q
t
1
> q
a
1
, which is equivalent to
v < 1, c:
This inequality is compatible with (A. 2) if
4 (1, 2v)
1 + v
(1, c) < v < 1, c;
which is the case if
v >
1
3
:
Therefore, if v > 1=3 and c < 1 , v (, v < 1 , c), the targeted
degradation strategy is protable for the dominant backbone whenever it
removes the targeted backbone as an active competitor.
F Transit decision under myopic behavior
Consider the above targeted degradation strategy and assume that it removes
backbone 3 as a competitor. Then, after the rst period, the remaining
backbones' installed bases are, respectively:
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^
1
= 
1
+ q^
1
=

2
+
1
6
2 (1, c) + v
1, v
;
^

2
= 
2
+ q^
2
=

4
+
1
12
4 (1, c) + 5v
1, v
:
The total installed base at date 2 is
^
 =
^

1
+
^

2
=
3
4
+
1
12
8 (1, c) + 7v
1, v
;
while the dierence in installed base is
^
 =
^

1
,
^

2
=

4
,
3
12
v
1, v
=
1, 2v
1, v

4
:
The dominant backbone does not want to degrade connectivity in the
second period if
^
 < 


^


=
1, 2v
3 (1, v) (3, 2v)
h
2 (1, c) + (3, v)
^

i
:
It can be shown that the stronger condition
^
 < 

(3=4) is satised
(that is, the dominant backbone has no incentive to degrade connectivity
even if we ignore the expansion in the total installed base). This condition
writes as
1, 2v
1, v

4
<
1, 2v
3 (1, v) (3, 2v)

2 (1, c) + (3, v)
3
4

and is satised if it is so when c = 1, in which case it boils down to

4
<
(3, v)
(3, 2v)

4
;
which is always true whenever there are network externalities (v > 0).
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